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ORD-3803-74

26 August 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
SUBJECT: Interim Report on Analyst Training

1. Attached is a memorandum prepared by a member of my staff in CDAM/ORD commenting on the [] report on analyst training. As you will note, the comments focus on the deficiencies of the report. [] identifies two pedagogical shortcomings in the recommendations for improving analyst training:

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a. The absence of an explicit analysis of the causes identifying deficiencies in our ability to establish intelligence analysis priorities, define present analytical problems and anticipate future analytical problems. Without performing the diagnostic step soundly, it would only be fortuitous that the subsequent prescription will be of much help.

b. A category of analytical methodology excluded from those recommended is that relating to interdisciplinary problems. It would not be difficult to catalog such problems as might face us in the future (see, for example, "Some Likely Key Intelligence Questions for the 1980's" RPD 1, 1 June 1974, or "Saturday Review World," 24 August 1974). This problem category comprises conceptual frameworks larger in scope than those listed in the report or presently carried by OTR in that they encompass several theoretical approaches derived from more than one discipline integrated for the purpose of treating problems characterized by a spectrum of complex parameters. The solution of these problems within the context of the curriculum of OTR is probably best solved by coordinating several Agency resources under the leadership of a full-time "dean" (recommended by [] []).

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2. As it now stands, the report on analyst training is seriously flawed, not only for the reasons given in paragraph 1 but also because of its distorted perspective. That is, the report looks at the world of intelligence analysis from the point of view of instruction or education. I am reminded of a series of drawings of the B-17 seen through the eyes of an engine designer, an aerodynamicist, a pilot, a bombardier, etc. Each distorted the aircraft by over-emphasizing his area of interest. So too with the [] report. Centralizing analyst support around the teaching function might be valid if the Agency were in the business to produce intelligence analysts or intelligence analyses. Our primary work involves timely, accurate, and definitive intelligence, in the broadest sense. This, by the merest of coincidence, happens to include research, development, operations, and collection, too. The analogy of the Agency to the university has been stretched to the point of incredulity. Our primary function is not to do intelligence research or scholarly intelligence analysis; our primary function is to factually inform decision-making elements of the Executive Branch about the detailed characteristics of certain kinds of national problems. For this reason a broader look at OTR vis a vis training analysts is in order.

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3. Inasmuch as the recommendations regarding courses deal with techniques that a priori concern the intelligence production process, including the improvement of communications, they are welcome and desirable additions to the curriculum of OTR. In particular, Rodriguez's observation about the influence of the working environment on returning newly trained analysts is a good one. The seminar idea is also sound, to a point. It begins to weaken at the suggestion of tasking the seminars by the Deputy Directors to produce specific intelligence products. This is construed as a weakness not because analysis must always be done within the confines of narrow bureaucratic components or because there is no room for improvement in producing intelligence analyses. I believe there is. However, if that is the problem at hand, it is much broader than analyst training and should be so approached. There were a number of "structural" changes recommended that are a mixed bag. The one that got most of my attention was the recommendation to place the Center for the Development of Analytical Methodology in the "Institute" because of its "Agency-wide application rather than within the Directorate of Science and Technology." Much of the commentary in paragraph 2 is relevant to this recommendation. Noteworthy is the authors' ignorance of the fact that the DDS&T is specifically tasked with R&D

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for the entire Agency. It might also be useful to bear in mind that OTR does not do well at creating or developing analytical methodologies; it does reasonably well at teaching established methodologies to others. Now it may very well turn out that developing analytical methodology in OTR would be most effective for the Agency. It is not clear to me how you rationally came to that conclusion without also taking a close look at analytical methodology as an R&D function. The suggestion is made that the term "training" is belittling and that "institute" is more suitable. That may be true, but at this stage institute is presumptive and invites derision if it is not backed by a significant academic content. This suggestion reflects a popular management (marketing?) tactic now in vogue: "rename it and viola!--it is redone." It might be better to wait and see how OTR develops before renaming it. The other structural changes recommended appear sound if difficult to achieve as in the case of a community learning center. Faculty borrowing and the separation of academic and administrative functions in OTR are good ideas.



James V. Hirsch
Director of Research and Development

Attachment:
As stated

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